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RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES REVIEWED
RiCHARD C. BAXKRR*
Three years ago the United States Supreme Court decided the
celebrated cases of Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge.' These
cases dealt with certain restrictive covenants in conveyances, which
were directed against the ownership and use of land by Negroes
in the states and in the District of Columbia. The Court held that
the covenants themselves were valid, but that an effort to enforce
them by the judiciary was void. It maintained that such an attempt
by a state court would constitute a denial of the equal protection of
the law, while similar action by a federal tribunal in the Capital
area would be contrary to the public policy of the national govern-
ment.
It is charged by many that these decisions really represented the so-
ciological predelictions of the justices rather than the prevailing opini-
on of a constitutional majority of the people.2 The allegation is that
the court disregarded public sentiment in the matter, and imposed
on the nation a mode of conduct which it had not sought. If the
court, it is argued, had shown a decent respect for the long estab-
lished customs and practices of the populace, an almost unbroken
line of previous court rulings and the consistent attitude of the legis-
lative bodies, it would never have tampered with racial convenants.
Agreements of this nature have been used in the United States
since 1872,s and probably longer, though it was not until after
World War I that they came before the courts in considerable num-
bers. In one of the few pre-war cases,4 a United States Circuit
Court bad held that the enforcement of such stipulations contravened
the equal protection clause, but this decision stood alone and never
became a precedent. Subsequent federal courts5 invaribly sup-
ported both the covenants and their judicial enforcement.
*Member of New York Bar; Associate Professor of Political Science, Drake University.
Harvard, A.B., 1926; Cornell, A.M., 1927; Columbia, Ph.D., 1941.
1. 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ; 334 U. S. 24 (1948).
2. Generally speaking, a constitutional majority of the people is one which
expresses itself through a two-thirds vote in each house of congress and ma-
jority votes in each chamber of three-fourths of the state legislatures. It
would be possible for this majority actually to represent a minority of the
people, but on most occasions it has reflected the opinion of a major segment
of the population.
3. Anthony v. Stephens, 46 Ga. 241 (1872).
4. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C. Cal. 1892).
5. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1925) ; Torrey v. Wolfes, 6 Fed. 2d
702 (D. C. Cir. 1925); Castleman v. Avignone, 12 Fed. 2d 326 (D. C. Cir.
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The state tribunals likewise had been in the habit of sanctioning
these contracts. One group of state courts sustained those which
applied to the use of real property,6 while another upheld the type
which pertained to both use and ownership.7 Several judicial groups
of the first category probably would have approved covenants relat-
ing to ownership also, had the question of their validity been pleaded.
Three state benches8 acknowledged the legality of racial limitations
against use but ruled out those barring ownership as being unlawful
restraints upon alienation. All told, the judiciaries of about 20 states
1926); Russell v. Wallace, 279 U. S. 871 (1929); Cornish v. O'Donahue, 279
U. S. 871 (1929); Edwards v. West Woodbridge Theatre Co., Inc., 55 Fed. 2d
524 (D. C. Cir. 1931); Grady v. Garland, 302 U. S. 694 (1937); Hundley v.
Gorewitz, 132 Fed. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1942) ; Mays v. Burgess, 147 Fed. 2d 869
(D. C. Cir. 1945); Hurd v. Hodge, 162 Fed. 2d 233 (D. C. Cir. 1947).
6. Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 365, 110 So. 810 (1926); Los Angeles Invest-
ment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Janss Investment Co. v.
Walden, 196 Cal. 753, 239 Pac. 34 (1925); Forest Lawn Association v. de
Jarnette, 79 Cal. App. 601, 250 Pac. 581 (1926); Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal.
46, 269 Pac. 660 (1928); Littlejohns v. Henderson, 111 Cal. App. 115, 295
Pac. 95 (1931) ; Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 Pac. 2d 496 (1932);
Burldardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 Pac. 2d 720 (1944); Stone v.
Jones, 66 Adv. Cal. App. 313, 152 Pac. 2d 19 (1944); Fairchild v. Raines,
24 Adv. Cal. App. 812, 151 Pac. 2d 260 (1944); Meade v. Dennistone, 173
Md. 302, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. W.
330 (1922) ; Shultes v. Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N. W. 102 (1927); Sipes v.
McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. 2d 638 (1946); Thornhill v. Herdt, (Mo.
App. 1939) 130 S. W. 2d 175 (1939); Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198
S. W. 678 (1946) ; Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511 (1937), 296 N. Y. S.
936; Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N. C. 290, 37 S. E. 2d 895 (1946); Doherty v.
Rice, 240 Wisc. 389, 3 N. W. 2d 734 (1942).
7. Chandler v. Zeigler, 88 Colo. 5, 291 Pac. 822 (1930) ; Stewart v. Cronan,
105 Colo. 392, 98 Pac. 2d 999 (1940); Dooley v. Savannah Bank and Trust
Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. 2d 522 (1945); Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App.
519 (1934) ; Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. 2d 37 (1939) ; Clark v.
Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930); United Cooperative Realty Co.
v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, 108 S. W. 2d 507 (1937) ; Queensborough Land Co.
v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo.
573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918) ; Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 115 S. W.
2d 529 (1938) ; Porter v. Pryor, 164 S. W. 2d 353 (1942) ; Swain v. Maxwell,
355 Mo. 448, 196 S. W. 2d 780 (1946) ; Lion's Head Lake v. Brzezinski, 23 N. J.
Misc. 290, 43 A. 2d 729 (1945) ; Dury v. Neeley, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 677 (1942) ;
Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. (N. Y.) 310, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 680 (1947); Vernon
v. Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1946) ; Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla.
567, 133 Pac. 2d 555 (1942); People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109
Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794 (1908) ; Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Ave. Church of
Christ, 79 Ohio App. 457, 70 N. E. 2d 487 (1946), app. dism. 147 Ohio St.
537, 72 N. E. 2d 97 (1947); Crump v. Perryman, 193 S. W. 2d 233, (Civ.
App. Tex., 1946). See D. 0. McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation, 33
CAIrn0RNrA LAw REVrWv 4 (1945); Isaac N. Groner and David M. Helfeld,
Racial Discrimination in Housing, 57 YAv, LAw Rivmnw 426 (1947).
8. California, Michigan and West Virginia. See Los Angeles Investment Co.
v. Gary, supra; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183
Pac. 470 (1919) ; Stratton v. Cornelius, 99 Cal. App. 8, 277 Pac. 893 (1929) ;
Foster v Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 Pac. 2d 497 (1933); Porter v. Barrett,
233 Mich. 373, 206 . W. 532 (1925); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150
S. E. 531 (1929).
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sanctioned racial bans in deeds and leases in one form or another,
whereas only one, that of Pennsylvania, 9 condemned all such restric-
tions regardless of the kind of tenure involved.
Prior to the 1948 decisions, the state legislatures, like the courts,
had showed a strong disposition to accept racial covenants. All
forty-eight, except perhaps that of the Quaker State, inferentially
recognized such provisions by failing to declare them void. A num-
ber gave added evidence of their approval of this particular species
of discrimination by prohibiting many other forms but leaving this
one untouched. In New Jersey, for example, as noted by one of its
courts in 1945,10 the lawmakers had banned color discrimination as
to jury service, employment practices, labor on public works and
hiring in defense industries, but had declined to interdict those in
covenants.
The New York courts found an analagous situation in the Empire
State. They discovered that over a period of years the legislature
had enacted a series of laws condemning certain racial barriers, but
had never proscribed the use or enforcement of covenants which
drew the color line. 1' The closest that body ever came to doing
the latter occurred in 1945, when it forbade racial and religious dis-
criminations by low-cost housing groups obtaining state financial
aid.' 2 During the next three years, however, it turned down bills
to prevent similar discriminations in redevelopment projects handled
by private companies which received assistance from the state through
its condemnation powers.' 8 Moreover, it rejected in 1947 a pro-
posal to amend the state's Civil Right Laws to make it read: "The
opportunity to purchase and to lease real property without restric-
tion because of race, creed, color or national origin is hereby recog-
nized and declared to be a civil right".14 Since the constitution of
19381s provided that no person should discriminate against another
9. Ellsworth v. Stewart, 9 ERiu Co. LAW JouRNAL 305 (1928); Yoshida v.
Gelbert Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D. & C. 321 (1946).
10. Lion's Head Lake v. Brzezinski, note 7, supra.
11. Kemp v. Rubin, note 7, supra; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation,
190 Misc. (N. Y.) 187, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 220, 299 N. Y. 517, 87 N. E. 2d 541, 339
U. S. 981 (1950) ; Pratt v. La Guardia, 182 Misc. (N. Y.) 462, 268 A. D. 973,
294 N. Y. 842.
12. McKiN xy's CONSOLIDATED LAWS op Nzv YoRK, Book 44-A, PuBLic
HOUSING LAW, § 223; Pratt v. La Guardia, note 12, supra.
13. MCKINxzY'S UNCONSOLIDATmD LAWS oF Nz w YORK, Book 65, § 3401;
Groner and Helfeld, note 7, supra; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant, note 12, supra; Pratt
v. La Guardia, note 12, supra; Kemp v. Rubin, note 7, supra.
14. Groner and Helfeld, note 7, supra; Kemp v. Rubin, note 7, supra.
15. Nzv YORKC STAam CoxsTiTUTIox, Article I, § 11. The text of the sec-
tion reads: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any
3
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in his civil rights on the grounds of race, the passage of the above
amendment would have invalidated all racial covenants.
Of equal importance in indicating the public sentiment of New
York state towards this sort of contract was the attitude of the 1938
constitutional convention. Several attempts were made to induce
that assembly to include in the new basic law clauses denying state
or local aid for slum clearance to any public corporation or public
limited dividend housing company which should discriminate against
a tenant on account of race, color or creed ;16 but all of these efforts
proved futile. Still more noteworthy was the unwillingness of the
convention to adopt a section which would have declared unqualified-
ly that racial covenants were contrary to the public policy of the
state and hence unenforcible. "No person shall because of race,
color or creed," ran this proposal, ".. .be denied the right to own,
possess and enjoy any dwelling, room, or other premises . ..Any
provision in any deed, agreement, or promise contrary to any of the
provisions of this section shall be deemed contrary to the public
policy of the state and void, and shall not be enforcible in any court
"17
The legislature of Illinois handled the matter in a manner similar
to that of the New York legislature. It, too, in the past, had
banned racial discriminations in certain fields,' 8 but, save in one
minor respect, had always refrained from interfering with those in
covenants. As late as 1941 and 1943, it had declined to adopt several
measures, some of which would have rendered illegal racial segrega-
tion in public housing, and others of which would have voided deeds
and leases forbidding ownership or occupancy of real estate on
grounds of race or color. 19 It did, in 1947, put on the statute books
the Blighted Area Development Act, one section of which decreed
that "no deed of conveyance by the Land Clearance Commission or any
subsequent owner shall contain a covenant running with the land or
any other provisions prohibiting occupancy of the premises by any
person because of race, creed or color".2 0 But, as is quite evident,
person, or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or by any
agency or subdivisioh of the state".
16. Ni w YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1938 Proposed Amend-
ments: Proposals Nos. 10, 18, 203, 691. See note 12 for statute denying state
financial aid to groups indulging in racial discrimination.
17. Ibid., Proposals Nos. 49, 675.
18. ILLINois Rnvism STATUvS, 1949, chap. 38, §§ 125, 128h-128k, also chap.
36-11.
19. Harold L. Kahen, The Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants:
a Reconsideration of the Problem, 12 UNIVMSI'TY oV CHICAGO LAW REvzw,
210, footnote 50.
20. ILINOIs RtwCvsm STATUTE s, note 18, supra, chap. 67'/, § 82.
4
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this provision applied solely to occupancy and not to ownership, and
related only to those conveyances to which the state was a party in
some respect.
A situation somewhat parallel to the ones just mentioned existed
in Michigan and Minnesota. In Michigan, there were various sta-
tutes on the subject of race bias such as those outlawing discrimina-
tion in public educational and mental institutions, in places of accom-
modation and amusement and in the matter of issuing insurance poli-
cies, but none had ever been passed annulling racial covenants.
2 1
In Minnesota, the law2 2 strongly denounced discrimination in real
property transactions based on religious faith or creed but omitted any
reference to those grounded in race.
A state's attitude on the subject of restrictive covenants is indi-
cated to a considerable extent by its general feeling toward racial
segregation. As is common knowledge, on the eve of the covenant
decisions, all of the southern and a few of the border states had been
requiring for years the separation of the races on a fairly broad scale.
But, more significantly, a number of nothern states had beefn following
a similar course, though to be sure to a somewhat lesser degree.
Those in the latter group stressed mostly their opposition to inter-
racial marriages and to mixed schools.28  Some states, no doubt,
would also have decreed residential segregation had they not been
restrained by the somewhat incongruous Supreme Court decision
of Buchanan v. Warley of 1917,24 which prohibited this practice.
21. Sipes v. McGhee, note 6, supra. See also note 8 for Michigan's attitude
toward covenants which were restraints upon alienation.
22. MiNNzsoTA STATumtrS, Annotated, § 507.18. Subdivision one of this sec-
tion provides: No written instrument hereafter made, relating to or affecting
real estate, shall contain any provision against conveying, mortgaging, en-
cumbering or leasing any real estate to any person of a specified religious faith
or creed, nor shall any such instrument contain any provision of any kind or
character discriminating against any class of persons because of their religious
faith or creed...
23. California, Idaho, Indiana and Oregon, to mention a few northern states,
voided marriages between white and colored people. See Civil, COne OF CALl-
roaxlA, 1941, §§ 60, 69, also ConI olt 1949; IDAHO CODE, § 32-206; BURNS
INDiANA STATum, Annotated, § 10-4222; OREGoN CO mIprID LAws, Annotated,
§ 63-102. Arizona compelled racial separation in primary grades, and placed
it on a permissive basis in high schools. New Mexico, Wyoming, Kansas and
Indiana gave local school boaxds authority to establish separate schools for
Negroes. See Maurice R. Davie, Negroes in American Society, McGraw Hill,
1949, p. 145. In 1949, local school boards of Indiana lost the power to segre-
gate children in schools. See BuRNs INDIANA STATuas, § 28-5104.
24. 245 U. S. 60. In this case, the Supreme Court had voided as a violation
of due process a city segregation ordinance enacted under the city's police power.
The Court here was particularly solicitous about protecting the property right
to buy and sell real estate without restriction, and threw the police regula-
tion out because it conflicted with this right. But it is difficult to understand
why if the police power could be invoked constitutionally, as it had been time
and time again, to prevent race friction in public conveyances, it could not be
5
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The question might be asked at this point, why racial covenants
had not been wiped out by statute a long time ago. Perhaps the best
answer is that the legislators knew that their constituents did not
want them eliminated. Arnold Forster, civil rights director of the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, recently conducted a poll
among college students, which would seem to lend support to this
explanation. According to his survey, "an encouraging number" of
students did not want to set any limits, short of actual inter-marriage,
to their associations with minorities. Furthermore, nearly 80 per cent
of the non-Jewish seniors said that it would make no difference to them
if a member of a minority group worked beside them, while 70 per
cent declared that they would be willing to entertain any of them in
their homes. Mr. Forster admitted, however, that "when it was pro-
posed to move a minority group into a neighborhood, the shoe really
began to pinch", though even here he found that "47 per cent said
they would not object".2 5 'But if this last figure is correct for college
students, who are generally credited with a high degree of tolerance,
the percentage for the less educated groups would doubtless be well
below the 40 mark.
Stymied in their efforts to get the legislators, and more particularly
the courts, to declare racial covenants void, the opponents of these
covenants pursued a new tack. They undertook, and were able, to
persuade the Supreme Court to hold that the judicial enforcement of
such covenants constituted a type of state action which fell under
the ban of the equal protection clause. To buttress their position,
both they and the court cited a number of former Supreme Court
decisions as precedents.2 6 But what all of these people, including
the justices, failed to recognize was that those decisions dealt with
the judicial enforcement of the state's own public policy and not that
of purely private contracts. Where public policy is in question, the
state is a primary actor and has what might be called a "personal"
interest at stake, while in the case of a valid agreement such as a
restrictive covenant, it merely assumes the role of a neutral third
used for the same purpose in residential areas. Moreover, it is hard to see
why the right to purchase a particular piece of real property should be given
such a higher degree of protection than the right to occupy a specific unused
seat in a bus or school,
25. Arnold Forster, A Menace to Freedom, Look Magazine, April 11, 1950,
p. 13.
26. Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Residence, 32 MIcHIGA LAW Rtvizw
721 (1934) ; Edward F. Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 MINXE-
SOTA LAW Rtv-mW 219 (1946); D. 0. McGovney, note 7, supra; Harold L.
Kahen, note 19, supra; Shelley v. Kraemer, note 1, supra.
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party, which enforces the agreement without any concern for the
racial or other factors that might be involved.2 7
A case often quoted by the anti-covenanters on this point was
Virginia v. Rives,2 8 decided in 1879. They stressed that portion of
the opinion in which the Supreme Court had said: "It is doubtless
true that a State may act through different agencies either by its
legislature,. its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibi-
tion of the amendment extends to all actions of the State denying
equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these
or by another". But the situation which prompted the court to make
this observation was concerned entirely with the public policy of the
state, and had nothing to do with private discrimination. Two Ne-
groes under indictment asked the trial court in Virginia to modify
an all-white panel so that one-third of it would consist of colored
men. Otherwise, they claimed, they would be deprived of equal pro-
tection. The Virginia Judge, however, denied their motion, declar-
ing in effect that it would be contrary to the state's policy to appor-
tion jurors on a racial basis. The Supreme Court held with him
since it was unable to find any intentional discrimination against the
Negroes.
In the well-known case of Twining v. New Jersey,29 a defendant
took exception to the judge's charge that the jury might consider the
failure of the accused to take the witness stand in his own defense.
The defendant argued that the state, acting through the court, was
thus denying him the right of exemption from self-incrimination,
which right was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Regard-
less of the merits of this contention, it is quite obvious that all that
the judge was doing was voicing the policy of the state as he saw it;
as in the previous case, he was not trying to enforce a private con-
tract. The Supreme Court, incidentally, rejected the defendant's
plea and sustained the judge.
Another case put forth by this group was Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust
and Savings Company v. Hill.3 0 Here, a lower court denied a tax-
payer an injunction to prevent the collection of an alleged discrimina-
tory assessment by a, tax board. The court asserted that the peti-
tioner had been guilty of laches in that he had failed to file a com-
plaint against the discrimination with the state tax commission be-
fore the tax books had been sent to the collector. The highest court
of the state, however, had ruled prior to the Brinkerhoff-Faris case
27. Note, 45 MicHiGAN LAW IZvlmw 733, 741 (1947).
28. 100 U. S. 313 (1879).
29. 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
30. 281 U. S. 673 (1929).
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that the commission had no authority to receive or act on such a
complaint, but later, after the filing time in this case had expired,
had reversed itself and found that this body possessed the necessary
power. In short, the upper court had declared the policy of the state
to be one thing on one occasion and something else on another,
thereby making it impossible for the petitioner to comply with the
required procedure. This type of judicial action, said the Supreme
Court, was a denial of due process.
The other cases8 l dealing with this question also pertained to the
enforcement of the public policy of the state. Not one of them in-
volved a private agreement. In these instances, a state court was
either barring Negroes from juries, denying a defendant counsel
or abridging a person's freedom of speech.
The opponents of restrictive covenants also maintained and succeed-
ed in convincing the Supreme Court that even though the law per-
mitted Negroes to discriminate against Caucasians in real estate
matters to the same extent that Whites might take like action against
colored people, the equal protection requirement was not satisfied.
They reasoned that the right which each Negro had in this respect
was a personal one, which could not be made to depend upon the
right of others of his race to discriminate or be discriminated against.
Among those to employ this argument was Chief Justice Vinson,
who used it in the Kraemer decision. "The rights created by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment," he averred, "are, by
its terms guaranteed to the individual... The rights established are
personal rights."
32
The Chief justice called in support of his thesis the opinion of the
Court in the case of McCabe v. The Atchison, Topeka and Sante
Fe Railroad Company.33 Here Justice Charles Evans Hughes, on
behalf of the court, had asserted in 1914 that the essence of the con-
stitutional right of a colored person to have railroads furnish him
with equal accommodations "is that it is a personal one". "It is,"
wrote Hughes, "the individual who is entitled to the equal protection
of the laws". Standing by themselves, these quotations would appear
to have substantiated Vinson's position, but when placed in their
proper setting they actually did nothing of the sort.
31. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U. S. 86 (1920); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941);
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
32. Shelley v. Kraemer, note 1, supra.
33. 235 U. S. 151 (1914). Hughes acknowledged that it was not an infrac-
tion of the 14th amendment for a state to require separate but equal accommoda-
tions for the two races.
8
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This case grew out of an Oklahoma law, which, while requiring
railroads to provide equal but separate accommodations for colored
and white people in coaches at all times, nevertheless relieved them
from furnishing chair and Pullman car service for one of the races
if the amount of travel by its members did not warrant the use of
this mode of conveyance. Taking advantage of this exception in
the law, the Sante Fe Railroad denied a Negro34 a Pullman seat
for the reason that he was the only colored man calling for one.
However, he appealed this denial to the Supreme Court, alleging that
his individual right in the matter did not rest upon the exercise of a
similar right by others of the African race, and won his point. But
what the Negro did not claim, yet what he would have had to claim
and receive judicial sanction of, in order to make the McCabe case
authority for the Kraemer case was that he was entitled not merely
to equal Pullman accommodations whenever he desired them but
to the use of any such facilities, whether set apart for Black or White,
as long as he paid his fare. This important distinction was not ex-
plained ifn the Kraemer decision.
If the principle of the Kraenter case is correct, it is difficult to see
how a state logically has the power to deny to a member of either race
the right to take any unoccupied seat in a train, bus or school room.
Under the Kraemer theory, the right of an individual to occupy an
unused seat apparently is a personal one, which no segregation law
can affect. Yet the Supreme Court has shied from making such a
sweeping rule up to the present date.8 5
When the question of racial covenants in the District of Columbia
came before the Supreme Court, that tribunal found little difficulty
in convincing itself that these covenants should not be enforced. There
was no need to consider any constitutional issue, it concluded, for con-
gress had long since outlawed the enforcement of such agreements
as a matter of public policy.36 The statement of that policy was con-
tained in Section 42 of the Civil Rights Law, first enacted in 1866,
which provided: "All citizens of the United States have the same
right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property".
3 7
But one of the defects in this argument is that there is no proof
34. There were actually five Negroes bringing this action.
35. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) ; Henderson v. The Interstate
Commerce Commission and The Southern Railroad Company 339 U. S. 816
(1950).
36. Hurd v. Hodge, note 1, supra.
37. 8 U. S. C. A., § 42,2 F. C. A., Title 8, § 42.
9
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that congress ever meant Section 42 to apply to the District of
Columbia. If the national lawmakers had wanted it extended to
that area, all- that they would have had to do was to have added the
words "and in the District of Columbia" to the phrase "in every state
and territory". Furthermore, congress generally placed all provi-
sions dealing with real estate in the nation's capital in the real pro-
perty section s8 of the Code of the District of Columbia, but there
is none in there banning restrictive covenants. Then too, it is not
without significance that in Title 48 of the United States Code, which
is entitled "Territories and Insular Possessions," the District of Co-
lumbia is not listed as a territory along with Alaska, Hawaii and our
other possessions. However, Section 1432 of this Title does pro-
vide that "deeds and other instruments affecting land situated in the
District of Columbia or any territory of the United States may be
acknowledged in the islands of Guam and Samoa before any Notary
Public . . ."39 Here, at least, congress did not regard the District
to be a territory but rather a separate and distinct subdivision.
But, if for the sake of argument, it is admitted that Section 42 was
intended to include the District, still there is nothing to show that
congress had planned through it to interdict the enforcement of valid
private contracts such as racial covenants. Undoubtedly, all that it
ever had in mind in enacting the section was to prevent the various
federal subdivisions from denying a Negro any rights which they
gave to a Caucasian, evidence of which is to be found in congress'
attitude toward these covenants in the years following the passage
of this law. Soon after 1866, property owners began placing racial
restrictions in deeds,40 and as time passed this practice was acceler-
ated. And when efforts were made to contest such agreements, the
federal courts, as previously shown,4 1 were almost unanimous in up-
holding them and their enforcement. Congress was certainly aware
of the positions of the courts and the property owners on the sub-
ject, and had it felt that the former were misconstruing its design or
that the latter were acting under a misconception of the law, it could
easily have remedied the situation either by making the Civil Rights
Law more explicit or by adding an appropriate provision to the real
property section of the Code for the District, mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph. That the national legislature took neither of these
steps, can only be construed to mean that it had accepted both the
courts' and the owners' interpretation of its intention.
38. CODE OF THz DISTRIcT OF COLUMBIA, § 45.
39. 48 U. S. C. A., see § 1432.
40. See note 3, supra.
41. See note 5, supra.
10
South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss4/4
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES REVIEWED
The Chief Justice went on to hold in the Hurd case that even with-
out Section 42 the Court could not enforce these covenants because
to do so would be against the public policy of the United States for
another reason. "It is not consistent with the public policy of the
United States," he declared, "to permit federal courts in the nation's
capital to exercise general equitable powers to compel action denied
the state courts where such action has been held to be violative of
the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. We cannot pre-
sume that the public policy of the United States manifests a lesser
compassion for the protection of basic rights against discriminatory
action of the federal courts than against action taken by the courts
of the states."4 The public policy of the United States, of which
the Chief justice spoke here, is generally determined by congress,
provided it has not already been fixed by the constitution. That
body decides what type of procedure, 48 equitable and otherwise, shall
be employed in the federal jurisdictions, quite apart from the kinds
the states might use or be permitted to use in their jurisdictions. In
the case of restrictive covenants, if congress' attitude toward enforc-
ing them could be gauged by its reactions to pertinent court deci-
sions, it has long since accepted the equitable method of making them
effective.
Two previous court rulings dealing with this class of covenants
caused the court considerable annoyance in the Hurd case; one of
them was especially troublesome to the Chief Justice. In Hundley
v. GoreZitZ,44 a 1942 case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia had under consideration the enforcement of a
covenant which provided that certain property should not be rented,
sold, transferred or conveyed to a Negro. The Court, in this particu-
lar instance, denied an injunction to restrain a colored man from
taking title or occupancy, but, at the same time, left no doubt that,
as a general rule, it would enforce such agreements in equity. "But
in view of the considered adjudications in similar cases," stated the
court, "it must be conceded that the settled law in this jurisdiction
is that such covenants as this are valid and enforcible in equity by
way of injunction." The interesting aspect of this decision is that
Chief judge Groner's opinion was accepted apparently in its entire-
ty by Associate Judge Fred M. Vinson, the same jurist who, later
42. Hurd v. Hodge, note 1, supra.
43. CODE OV THn DisTmc'r OF COLUMBIA, Title 11-306,325,326.
44. 132 Fed. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1942). What the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals actually did was to refuse to disturb the District Court's denial of the
injunction. The ground for the denial was that conditions had changed since
the making of the covenant due to the fact that other Negroes had been al-
lowed to move into the area in question.
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from the Supreme Court bench, was to hand down the Kraemer and
the Hurd rulings. Wiley Rutledge, the third justice, on the other
hand, was not so certain of the Chief Justice's law; he was ready
to concur in the decision but wanted to reserve opinion as to whether
this specific covenant was valid.
Another case, Mays v. Burgess,45 which came before this same
court in 1945, dealt with a similar covenant against sale and use.
The district court had cancelled a deed given in violation of the re-
striction and had enjoined a colored man from using the property.
The Negro had appealed from this ruling to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, arguing that the judgment should be set aside as being
contrary to public policy. But the higher tribunal rejected his plea,
stating that "rights created by covenants such as these have been so
consistently enforced by us as to become a rule of property and with-
in the accepted public policy of the District of Columbia".4 6 The
defendant then asked the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in
order to bring the case up to that tribunal but his request was denied
with Justices Stone, Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and Roberts, ac-
cording to the record, voting to refuse issuance of the writ, and on-
ly Justices Murphy and Rutledge favoring the granting of it. Jus-
tices Reed and Jackson did not participate.47 While it is not clear
just why the Court denied the writ, conceivably it might have done
so on purely technical grounds. However, it is more likely that it
felt that the issue involved either was not of enough significance to
warrant its attention or presented no legal question for it to review.
A consistent adherence to the Supreme Court decisions in the cove-
nant cases may lead to some unforeseen and perhaps unsought con-
sequences. Let us suppose, for instance, that a property owner en-
ters into an agreement with a prospective buyer by telephone to sell
his property. All of the terms and conditions are entirely satisfac-
tory to both parties. The only delay in the consummation of the
transaction is a request by the owner to see the purchaser.in person
before transferring the deed. But on meeting the buyer and dis-
45. Mays v. Burgess, 325 U. S. 868 (1945). The personnel of the court has
changed since the Hundley case.
46. Ibid., p. 872. The court went on to say in its opinion: "The proposition
is not new and was unsuccessfully urged in the Corrigan case, supra, in this
court and in the Supreme Court. And nothing is suggested now that was not
considered then. The constitution is the same now as then, and we are cited
to no new public laws nor indeed to any other source or practice of Govern-
ment officials, which the private action of the original owners of the block in
question contravenes. And the public policy of a state of which the courts take
notice and to which they give effect must be deduced - in the main - from
these sources. Surely, it may not-properly-be found in our personal views
on sociological problems". (Italicized portion is found in the text.)
47. Mays v. Burgess, 325 U. S. 868 (1945).
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covering that he is a Negro, the seller refuses to convey. If the Ne-
gro should then ask the court for a decree of specific performance,
alleging that there was mutuality in every respect save the one based
on color, the failure of the court to grant the decree would, under
the Kraemer rule, apparently have to be labeled state action founded
on race discrimination. In such a case, the right of a person to re-
fuse to sell directly to a person because of color, which even those
who oppose restrictive covenants admit is a valid one, might not
mean a great deal [assuming that the Statute of Frauds is not in-
volved].
A troublesome problem may also arise in connection with cove-
nants which forbid the erection of buildings costing less than a certain
amount. A covenant of this nature might easily work against a
person of small means, who, although able to acquire a plot of ground,
perhaps through inheritance, would be foreclosed from building on
it due to a lack of funds to meet the covenant cost limitations. An
attempt to enforce such a restriction would have to fall because a
court would scarcely want to be put in the position of prohibiting a
discrimination in this type of matter against a colored man but per-
mitting it in the case of a poor person.
The Fourteenth Amendment, it should be remembered, does not
give a preferred status to people because of their color. The authors
of that part of the constitution could easily have written that prefer-
ence into it, but refused to do so. 48 Moreover, the courts, except in
the early days of the amendment, have never hesitated to allow it to
be invoked in cases other than those in which a colored party was
interested. And certainly labor organizations, Jehovah Witnesses
and other groups which have so often sought refuge in it would be
the last to acknowledge that anyone else had a prior claim to its
protection.
A perplexing situation would result if a proprietor should decline
to rent his property to a certain Negro solely because of the latter's
race, but the Negro should gain access to the premises without the
former's consent. The owner perhaps could collect damages in tres-
pass, but what about his chances of success in an eviction proceed-
48. Benjamin R. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen
on Reconstruction, Columbia University, 1914; Charles McLaughlin, The Court,
the Corporation and Conklin, 46 Amt lcAx HisToRicAL RzVw 45, October,
1940; L. B. Boudin, The Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment,
16 Nzw YORK UNrvimsir- LAw QUARzasTRY RvIw 19, November, 1938;
Howard J. Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment,
47 YALE LAw JotuRAY, 371, December-January, 1937-1938.
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ing? Could the court entertain such a proceeding without being
charged with violating the equal protection injunction ?49
Leaving the realm of real property and turning to a different field
of law, we might be confronted with another interesting circumstance.
A white person, we will say, is injured in an accident in which there
are ten joint tort-feasors, evenly split between white and colored
people. Under the law of that state the plaintiff may sue any or all
of these. He brings his action, however, against the Negroes alone,
who thereupon demand that the white tort-feasors be brought in as
party defendants. In this case, as in the other hypothetical ones, the
unwillingness of the court to grant a motion to this effect would
have to be construed a denial of equal protection on the ground of
color, if it could be shown that the plaintiff had been actuated entirely
by race prejudice.
When placed against their proper background, the Supreme Court's
rulings in the recent covenant cases unquestionably constitute bad
law. The employment of such covenants for generations both in the
states and in the District of Columbia, the refusal of a single state
legislature, except in a few minor instances, to nullify them, the
silence of congress for years in the face of their widespread use, and
the uniform sanctioning of them and their enforcement in equity by
state and federal courts alike make any other conclusion unrealistic.
Where the Court erred in the Kraemer case was in holding that there
was involved a question of constitutional rights, which it concededly
would have had authority to ajudicate, rather than merely one of
public policy, which the lawmakers alone should resolve. 50 The
Court erred in the Hurd case by attributing to a congressional law an
intent which its authors undoubtedly never had in mind.
There is a sizable school of thought in the country which em-
braces the notion that when the people or their representatives lag
in their social thinking, the judiciary should bring them up to date.
Some such idea apparently motivated the Supreme Court in decid-
ing the restrictive covenant cases. But this doctrine is a pernicious
one for it allows the courts to become creators of public policy, con-
trary to the principles and the traditions on which our constitutional
system is based. The task of formulating that policy has been con-
fided to a constitutional majority of the people or to the legislative
49. William R. Ming, Jr., Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amend-
ineut: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 UxIviaSTY o CiacAGo LAW Rl-
vmWv, p. 234 (1949); 45 MICHIGANT LAW REviEWv, note 27, supra.
50. It is the author's belief that even if the covenant decisions had never
been rendered, racial covenants in most instances should be eliminated, but
by legislative action, with ample time being given to property owners to ad-
just themselves to the new conditions which are certain to arise.
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branches of government,5 1 and should continue to rest exclusively
in them.
In this land, a constitutional majority is the final arbiter of the
nation's destiny, and in that capacity has the legal authority to pur-
sue any course it sees fit,52 even though that course might be impru-
dent and unjust. Regrettable and reprehensible as its action might
be, it could repeal the entire bill of rights and then establish a state
church or provide for censorship of the press. Yet, in this and in
similar situations, the Court's part in our scheme of government
should remain as it has always been, namely, to construe and give
effect to the wishes and intent of this majority. Its function should
never be to rectify this group's mistakes or to amend its shortcomings.
The advocates of the kind of judicial legislation found in the Hurd
and Kraemer decisions are playing at a dangerous game which con-
ceivably could be turned against them in a devastating fashion. It
would have been possible, for example, for a state legislature to have
declared racial covenants invalid as being contrary to public policy,
but for the Supreme Court to have held such a statute void on the
ground that it denied a person the right to dispose of his property
on the terms he desired. In that event, this type of legislation would
have been placed beyond the reach of the lawmakers and could have
been restored to their control only through the tedious amending
process or by a radical change in the personnel of the court. The
champions of the covenant decisions were fortunate in having their
cause heard by justices who were sympathetic to their philosophical
point of view; but on another occasion, they may not be so fortunate.
51. In some fields, it is true that the executive determines public policy. For
example, in the national area, the President decides in a large measure what
our foreign policy shall be.
52. This majority is probably foreclosed from taking from a state its equal
representation in the United States Senate. See Constitution of the United
States, Art. V.
15
Baker: Restrictive Covenant Cases Reviewed
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
